The classic vs. emotional Stroop 4 in green) stimuli" (p.324). They went on to suggest that: "the defining feature of all Stroop stimuli is the existence of a logical relationship, compatibility or incompatibility, between their components" is probably not even the most widespread. For example, in his original paper, Stroop (1935) proposed that: "the difference in the time for naming the colors in which the words are printed and the same colors printed in squares (or swastikas) is the measure of the interference of conflicting word stimuli upon naming colors" (p 659). Similarly, in his well-regarded review of research on the classic Stroop effect, MacLeod (1991) , referring to Stroop's original task (Experiment 2) as "the standard Stroop
Color-Word Test", speculated: "How should the standard color-word test be scored?.……the most prevalent [approach] is to calculate a difference score (interference card time -pure color card time)
following Stroop (1935) ." (p.166). It seems then that at least one widely-accepted (and indeed the original) definition of the Stroop effect is different to that proposed by Algom et al.
Second, as noted, Algom et al.'s definition of the Stroop effect involves subtraction of latencies in the congruent condition (e.g. the word red printed in red) from latencies in the incongruent condition. Although this particular definition may indeed be useful, when considered in isolation from other definitions (as in the Algom et al. article) it is potentially problematic. The difficulty here is that congruency of stimulus dimensions in the Stroop task often leads to facilitated color-naming, compared to standard control conditions such as rows of Xs (e.g., Glaser & Glaser, 1982) The classic vs. emotional Stroop 5 general point. Indeed, they stated that control conditions such as rows of Xs are "gratuitous in the classic task" (p.325). Interestingly, they added as a rider that "in the classic task incidentally, congruent stimuli are responded faster than XXXX stimuli" (p.325). In fact, this is not always the case (Sichel & Chandler, 1969) and such data provide a clear justification for why the definition of the Stroop effects needs to allow separate examination of putative interference and facilitation effects.
Interestingly, the congruent case (e.g. naming the ink color of the word red printed in red) that forms part of the Algom et al. definition was not really investigated until some 30 years after Stroop's original publication (Dalrympole-Alford & Budayr, 1966) , perhaps underlining the fact that it is not part of any uniformly-accepted definition of the Stroop effect.
The third difficulty concerns Algom et al.'s definition of a "Stroop stimulus"; namely, a stimulus for which the 'logical' relationship of congruency/incongruency between stimulus components holds. Again, this notion of a Stroop stimulus is not a uniformly-held view. For example, MacLeod (1991) in his aforementioned review included studies with priming conditions that consisted entirely of stimuli for which the Algom et al. 'logical' relationship is not present. Indeed, MacLeod (1991) included in his list of major empirical results regarding the Stroop effect the finding that "A color-unrelated word can be made to cause greater interference (or facilitation, or both) with color naming if its meaning is activated by a related word or phrase before the color-naming trial"(p. 203).
Although one can see why Algom et al. might have wanted to underline the fact that certain Stroop stimuli are qualitatively different in that they involve a particular 'logical' relationship between the stimulus components (as such distinctions may well be important), it is not clear that these stimuli alone should be worthy of the Stroop label. Similarly, it simply does not follow that tasks involving these stimuli are "unrelated" to tasks involving stimuli where this particular 'logical' relationship does not hold. According to Algom et al.'s second ("alternative") account , however: "the slowdown observed in naming the color of emotional words is unrelated to the Stroop effect" (p.325). Nevertheless, this alternative account relies on the fact that: " A dedicated system…captures threatening stimuli in an automatic fashion, prioritizes processing, thereby precipitating the temporary interruption of ongoing activity (e.g. color naming)" (p.325).
These two accounts seem to overlap considerably. Both seem to rely on the notion that emotional stimuli automatically recruit processing resources, thus leading to interference in other cognitive activities. The clearest apparent difference between the two accounts, based on this section of the Algom et al. paper, seems to be that the first account is in some way an 'attentional' effect whereby emotional words differentially recruit attentional resources away from color-naming, whereas the second account is an 'inhibition' account whereby the presence of a threatening stimulus leads to inhibition of all cognitive activity. However, this putative difference seems to slip through one's fingers when Algom et al. revisit their two accounts in the General Discussion section of their paper.
Here, in reference to their second account, they stated "the generic slowdown observed does not necessarily imply that the underlying mechanism is that of inhibition. Resources can be allocated in particular ways such that threat-irrelevant stimuli receive fewer resources. This depletion in turn processed by a 'postattentive attentional system'. The former system is fast, being automatic and parallel, while the latter is slow, being deliberate and serial. However, the database on the classic and emotional Stroop tasks shows that such a straightforward differentiation of the two phenomena is not really valid. For example, both effects survive masking of the word (color or emotional) stimuli (e.g.
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The classic vs. emotional Stroop 7 Daza, Ortells, & Fox, 2002; Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993) , suggesting, by Ohman's criteria, the operation of preattentive effects for both paradigms. Furthermore, both effects seem to involve postattentive processes. For instance, separating the distracter words from the colors on both tasks leads to changes in the degree of interference (Fox, 1993; MacLeod, 1991) . It is perhaps useful at this point to offer a somewhat different analysis of the putative critical differences between the classic and emotional Stroop tasks. Both tasks seem to involve automatic reading of the irrelevant words (MacLeod et al., 1991) . This automatic reading confers some interference with ink color naming which is why the presence of any word generally leads to a slowdown in such color naming, relative to naming ink patches. However, in addition, the semantic content of the word leads to additional interference (e.g. Klein, 1963) . In the classic Stroop, this additional interference is because the color words are semantically related to goals linked to the ongoing task demands (i.e., to color-naming) and, on the critical trials, it is because the color words are incongruent with the correct response required by the task. In the emotional Stroop, in contrast, the emotional words are related to goals reflecting chronic concerns about threat or the like (but are unrelated to the task demands to color-name). Furthermore, it seems likely that the recruitment of processing resources by the semantic analysis of threat-related words on the emotional Stroop task is more automatized (reflecting as it does chronic, survival-related processing) than the analogous situation in the classic task involving the processing of color words, which are only temporarily relevant to ongoing concerns due to the particular set of task demands (Logan, 1980 (Logan, , 1988 .
Applying this type of analysis, one would predict that the presence of emotional words would lead to interference on a range of resource-dependent cognitive tasks because the emotional words (by virtue of their relevance to current concerns) would recruit processing resources in a relatively automatic fashion away from those tasks. One such task might be ink color-naming, i.e. the emotional Stroop paradigm. In contrast, one would not predict that the presence of color words would have any differential effects on cognitive task performance, except on tasks that involved the processing of 7
The classic vs. emotional Stroop 8 color-information. Given this, one empirical challenge is to identify the task parameters that set boundaries on any interference effects of emotional words. For example, in contrast to the emotional Stroop data, classifying numbers as odd or even, while trying to avoid unmasked distracter words, seems to be unaffected by whether the distracters are emotional or neutral (Fox, 1996) .
Although in this section I have criticised the particulars of Algom et al.'s conceptual overhaul of the emotional Stroop, it is important to state that the process of elucidating the conceptual differences between the classic and emotional Stroop effect is without question a worthy exercise.
However, with respect to Algom et al.'s overall mission, it is equally important to note that demonstrating that any two paradigms might require somewhat different theoretical conceptualizations is not sufficient grounds to argue that they are unrelated -the conceptual similarities between the two paradigms may remain considerable and outweigh any differences.
Algom et al.'s five diagnostics
In the next section of their paper, Algom et al. proposed five "diagnostic" to distinguish their two theoretical accounts (discussed in the previous section). Even if one suspends skepticism temporarily about whether the two accounts are sufficiently different, it is not completely clear that all of these diagnostics would be able to distinguish between them.
The first diagnostic refers to the fact that the classic Stroop effect is stronger when the to-beignored color word varies, relative to when it is held constant. Algom et al. proposed that examining whether this is also true for the emotional Stroop effect could distinguish their two theoretical positions. However, if the processing of threatening information is "obligatory" (p.325) as proposed in Algom et al.'s first account or is a result of "a dedicated system [that] captures threatening stimuli in an automatic fashion…." (p.325) as proposed in their second account, it may well be the case that varying the content of the to-be-ignored emotional words, versus using a constant word, would have little effect on the degree of interference due to the relative automaticity of any attentional (account 1) or inhibition/defense (account 2) effects. In fact, there is no clear theoretical prediction here from either account. In other words, diagnostic one is not a diagnostic.
The second diagnostic notes that a hallmark of the classic Stroop effect is the asymmetry of interference to color and word whereby, on the classic task, color-naming is interfered with by 8
The classic vs. emotional Stroop 9 incongruous words but color word reading is not similarly affect by the presence of incongruous print colors. This asymmetry is also revealed in the related phenomenon of Garner interference in which variation in the content of the to-be-ignored stimulus (as discussed with respect to diagnostic one) has a greater effect on color-naming than on word reading, relative to the baseline condition of invariant stimulus content. Algom et al. posed the question of whether such asymmetry in Garner interference levels would also be present in the emotional task.
Before presenting some conceptual arguments regarding this second diagnostic, I must confess Given this assumption on my part, there are two conceptual points to make about diagnostic two. The first is that it makes little sense to look at the interference of print colors on the reading of emotional (or neutral) words as one would not expect any interference in this situation as the colors bear no relationship to either ongoing task demands (i.e. emotional/neutral word reading), or to chronic personal concerns. The second point is that, whether or not there is asymmetry in Garner interference does not distinguish between the two theoretical accounts that the authors have put forward as the effect relies on the same principles that constitute the first diagnostic -namely, taskirrelevant variation (see the discussion of diagnostic one). To spell this out, diagnostic two involves comparison of two conditions. The first condition -whether varying the ink colors of emotional words affects their reading times relative to neutral words -is misconceived as there is no reason to predict that ink color should influence emotional word reading and, critically therefore, the two theoretical accounts of Algom et al. do not make differential predictions on this issue. The second condition is essentially diagnostic one and, as I have argued, the two theoretical accounts do not make a differential prediction here either. Based on these two conceptual arguments, I would contend that diagnostic two is also not a diagnostic. The fourth diagnostic concerns the complementary relationship between word and color on the classic task such that "good performance with the words comes in tandem with poor performance with the colors and vice versa" (Algom et al, 2004; p.327) . This is essentially a variation of the points in diagnostics two and three and is a function of the logical relationship between stimulus dimensions on the classic task. However, again, as there is no reason to suppose that print color should interfere with emotional (or neutral) word reading, this complementarity seems of little relevance to the emotional Stroop task. Furthermore, it is again difficult to see how it can distinguish between the two accounts that the authors have put forward.
What Algom et al. also seem to be saying here, however, is that their first theoretical account would predict that emotional words would lead to more color-naming interference than neutral words (the emotional Stroop effect) but no difference in word-reading times for emotional versus neutral words. In contrast, their second general 'inhibition'/'defense' account would predict an emotional word delay for both color-naming and reading. However, it is not clear that this is an issue of complementarity as there remains no reason to suppose that increasing the salience of the ink colors should affect differential reading speeds for emotional versus neutral words in any way at all. Rather, this claim seems to constitute a separate (sixth) diagnostic altogether; that is, whether the presence of emotional words interferes with word reading or not. This issue is of course both important and Finally, for their fifth diagnostic, Algom et al. suggested that the extent to which any emotional delay extends in time to affect the processing of subsequent stimuli (regardless of their valence) can distinguish between their two accounts. They argued that their first account would not predict this but that their second account, which prescribes a general slowing in activity, would make such a prediction. It is not at all clear that these differential predictions follow from these two accounts. It is perfectly plausible that subsequent trials could be affected regardless to which account one subscribes; for example, because processing resources have been recruited differentially away from the dimension of print color (account one) or because there is a generic slowing/"freezing" of all ongoing activity (account two). Indeed, one could even apply this argument to the classic Stroop task by submitting that 'attending' to the incongruent color word interferes with concurrent color-naming but also means that on the next trial attentional resources are not optimally focussed on the dimension of ink color such that color-naming is impaired on that trial also. This is not a fanciful idea because there is a large literature on the phenomena of negative priming that relies on trial-to-trial carry over effects of Stroop processing, albeit of a different form. Interestingly, there exist unpublished data that speak to this issue (Mathews, personal communication) . In this unpublished study, both incongruent classic color Stroop stimuli trials and emotional Stroop stimuli trials were always followed by a trial involving color-naming a row of Xs (thus differing from the McKenna & Sharma, 2004 , study that focused only on the emotional Stroop). The critical comparisons were color-naming times for the row of Xs following the classic or emotional trials versus following a neutral word control trial. The data showed that both the emotional Stroop stimuli and the incongruent classic Stroop stimuli had carryover effects in terms of slowing color-naming on the subsequent trial, relative to the control condition.
In sum, the fifth diagnostic is also not a diagnostic.
Algom et al.'s six experiments 12
The classic vs. emotional Stroop 13 In the next section of their article Algom et al. described six experiments to address their five diagnostics, along with the additional 'sixth' diagnostic of whether there is an emotional delay with reading (and, in fact, lexical decision) as well as with color-naming. Algom et al. interpreted their data as supportive of the following conclusions: (a) the emotional Stroop effect is not sensitive to taskirrelevant variation; (b) The emotional effect does not display word-color reciprocity in interference; (c) the emotional effect is not affected by salience changes of word or color; (d) emotional words slow reading in the same way as they do color naming; (e) the emotional effect vanishes when emotionaland neutral-word trials are presented mixed together in the same block suggesting that it relies on carry-over effects to subsequent trials (in fact, the experiment that purportedly supports conclusion 'e' [Experiment 6] does not include an emotional Stroop condition, focusing instead entirely on word reading, and so this conclusion is not really justified); and, (f) the emotional delay is present when the task of reading is replaced by that of lexical decision.
I have already noted two things about the empirical data: first, they are largely non-diagnostic of the two theoretical positions that Algom et al. outlined in the introductory sections of their article.
Second, despite this, the data are interesting in that they tell us something about the experimental parameters that differentiate the classic and emotional Stroop tasks. However, this last point should not be overstated. Providing evidence that the classic and emotional tasks are susceptible to different experimental manipulations is not the same as showing that they are unrelated phenomena. Rather, it simply helps to clarify any differences between the phenomena.
Having noted the potential importance of such experiments, it is also important to point out that the experiments taken together have a number of significant methodological limitations that temper enthusiasm for the findings. First, Algom et al. used their experimental data to build an argument about cognitive processing in the face of threat. However, they did not have sufficient control conditions in their studies to demonstrate that their effects were unequivocally threat-related.
For instance, they may have achieved analogous results if they had used positive emotion words, indicating that the effects were perhaps due to emotionality, rather than threat, as has been found in a number of individual differences studies (e.g. Dalgleish, 1995, Experiment 2; Martin et al., 1991; Mogg & Marden, 1990) , although this possibility seems less likely given previous results in the
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The classic vs. emotional Stroop 14 literature with unselected samples (e.g. McKenna & Sharma, 2004) . Or, they may have achieved similar effects with words related to personal concerns or expertise, indicating that the effects were perhaps due to self-relevance rather than emotionality or threat (for instance, Dalgleish, 1995, showed analogous effects to the emotional Stroop effect using bird names with groups of ornithologists). Or, they may have found analogous results with words coding loss, indicating perhaps that the effects were related to negative emotion dimensions more generally, rather than specific to threat specifically.
These types of control condition are routinely used in emotional Stroop research to disentangle various theoretical interpretations of this nature (see Williams et al., 1996) .
Secondly, some of the Algom et al. findings could be due to other artifactual differences between their emotional (threat) words and the neutral words. For example, the emotional words used by Algom et al. frequently referred to potential situations that could arise (e.g. crisis, disaster), whereas the neutral words were essentially referring to objects or concepts. Alternatively, although Algom et al. sought to rule out category effects in their data on the basis that their neutral words, in a given experiment, were sourced from a single category (living environment, political science) to make them analogous to the emotional words, this is not really sufficient to rule out category effects. What is required is to show that the semantic relationship between the words is comparable across the emotional words and the neutral words. Related to this is the need to show that the two sets of words are equally representative members of their respective categories. In the Algom et al. studies, it is perfectly plausible that the emotional words were more tightly semantically inter-related and so, when presented in unmixed blocks, there was greater inter-stimulus priming leading to more 'interference' relative to the neutral material -this would therefore be an effect unrelated to emotion. This would also provide an account for why the emotional word effects disappear in the mixed block condition (Experiment 6).
Thirdly, although this is not strictly a methodological issue, these methodological concerns need to be considered in the light of the extant literature on the emotional Stroop task -something Algom et al. did not always do. For example, the emotional Stroop effect is not uniformly present in healthy participant samples (e.g. Dalgleish, 1995 -Experiment two; Martin, Williams & Clark, 1991; Thrasher, Dalgleish, & Yule, 1994) . A similar issue pertains to the emotional word reading effects. In
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The classic vs. emotional Stroop 15 contrast to the robust effect in Algom et al.'s data, other studies (e.g. Geller & Shaver, 1976; Martin et al., 1991 , Experiments 1 and 2) have not found that reading times are slower for emotional versus neutral words in healthy subjects. Finally, Algom et al. argued, on the basis of their Experiment 6 with mixed and unmixed blocks, that the absence of an emotional effect in word reading in the mixed blocks is support for their second theoretical account that the emotional Stroop effect is due to some form of general 'inhibition' that affects the subsequent trials and the effect is therefore 'washed out' when emotional and neutral trials are mixed together. I have noted several problems with this interpretation above. However, in addition, there are numerous studies in the literature in which emotional and neutral words are presented in mixed lists and where the clinical groups show an emotional Stroop effect (e.g. Dalgleish, 1995; Foa, Ilai, McCarthy, Shoyer & Murdoch, 1993; Lavy, van den Hout & Arntz, 1993; McNally, Riemann, Louro, Lukach & Kim, 1992 (Cohen, Dunbar, & McClelland, 1990) to the emotional Stroop
15
The classic vs. emotional Stroop 16 effect. On the back of this they then stated, in reference to the work of Williams et al. (1996) : "we certainly disagree with the general quest 'to have models that can apply to both the original colorconflict situation and the emotional Stroop' (p.22)" (p. 336) . It is understandable that if Algom et al.
believe that the two phenomena are simply unrelated they might have little enthusiasm for models that speak to both. However, as I have suggested throughout this commentary, it is not clear that the two phenomena are unrelated and therefore such modeling endeavors are valid and justified until this issue is convincingly resolved.
Perhaps this point can be better illustrated by considering another domain -cognitive neuroscience. Here, studies have shown that the emotional Stroop and classic Stroop effects have some neural substrates in common, reflecting the related aspects of the two tasks, and other neural substrates that are distinct. For example, (Compton et al., 2003) , in their fMRI study of the classic and emotional Stroop tasks, concluded: "dorsolateral frontal lobe activity was increased by both negative and incongruent color words, indicating a common system for maintaining an attentional set in the presence of salient distracters. In posterior regions of the brain, activity depended on the nature of the information to be ignored". (p. 81). However, perhaps a more convincing demonstration is the existence of connectionist models, derived directly from the work of Cohen et al. (1990) and utilizing their strength of processing pathways approach, that do in fact model both the classic and emotional Stroop tasks within the same networks (e.g. Matthews & Harley, 1996 and unpublished work by Battye -Battye, 2003; Battye, Barnard & Page, 2004) .
On a more general note, although there is a clear place for theoretical and computational models that focus on particular cognitive or behavioral phenomena (such as the model of Cohen et al., 1991) , a valid and worthy pursuit in psychology is surely to develop macro-theoretical models that can speak to a wider range of psychological effects. At the end of the day, it is such macro-theories that are likely to prove more valid when it comes to mapping functional level, psychological, models onto neuroscience models of human mentation to provide integrated theories of mind-brain (Barnard, May, Duke, & Duce, 2000; Dalgleish, 2004a Dalgleish, , 2004b Williams et al., 1996) . Reading through the introductory and empirical sections of Algom et al.'s paper, the emotional Stroop researcher could be forgiven for concluding that it is frankly unnecessary to look at the effects of emotional words on color-naminginstead, one could simply ask participants to read the words aloud to produce analogous results. This would be a useful empirical outcome of the Algom et al. data series -if it were true. However, when Algom et al. did address the issue of individual differences in their General Discussion, it transpires that they did carry out an individual differences study involving patients with a diagnosis of PTSD.
Here they found that the emotional Stroop effect was greater than the emotional delay with word reading, in contrast to all of the other results in their six experiments. On this basis, to their credit, Algom et al. stated that "it is arguable that the comparable performance across reading and colornaming is limited to healthy, unselected groups of participants" (p. 336). What Algom et al. did not do, however, is draw out the theoretical implications of these data. Essentially, such a result presents significant problems for any account that suggests that the emotional Stroop effect is simply the result of a generic "defense" or "inhibition" mechanism that acts similarly on all ongoing activity (Algom et al.'s second theoretical account) because the effects seem to be different in clinical groups for colornaming and word reading (not to mention that other cognitive tasks are unaffected by the presence of emotional words e.g. number categorisation, Fox, 1996) . Some other theoretical account is therefore clearly required to map out why some tasks are unaffected by the presence of threat while others are not.
